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The paper investigates the role of credit constraints on export, import and two-way trade
activities of European manufacturing firms. Using direct financial constraints indicators and
accounting for endogeneity issues, we find that credit rationing significantly reduces both the
probability of entering foreign markets and the intensive margins of trade. Empirical results
also point out that the role of extra entry costs differs according to the location of foreign
markets and to the type of imported goods and services. Conditional on trading in the EU,
rationing is not an obstacle to enter additional exporting and importing markets, even though
two-way traders behave differently and are negatively affected by financial constraints when
they enter multiple markets.
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The comparative advantage of a country is shaped by well functioning financial institutions,
as financial frictions may prevent countries from receiving the expected benefits from inter-
national activities. The role of financing conditions on trade has been at the center of the
debate long before the financial crisis started, leading to a collapse in world trade flows.
There are significant differences between the costs sustained by purely domestic firms
and firms that operate also in international markets. Exporting activities involve the need
to acquire information on local customers, adapt products to needs and tastes or set up new
distribution networks. Another source of extra-costs relates to the degree of unpredictability
of foreign sales and the difficulty of enforcing international transaction contracts, which can
also affect importers (Altomonte and Be´ke´s, 2010). In the same way, importers face fixed
costs of exploring new foreign markets and establishing linkages with suppliers and costs to
adapt foreign intermediates and technologies to their production process.
Much of the empirical literature on financial constraints and trade has focused on exports
and, following the pioneering work of Greenaway et al. (2007), mainly consisted in single
country studies on the effects of credit constraints on the extensive and intensive margins of
export (Muuˆls, 2008; Minetti and Zhu, 2011; Secchi et al., 2011; Wagner, 2014b).1 Conversely,
only three studies have analysed the relationship between financial constraints and import
activities. Bas and Berthou (2012) develop a theoretical framework to describe the main
mechanisms through which credit access affects firms’ import choices and, based on Indian
data, finds that firms that are ex-ante more liquid and less leveraged are more likely to import
foreign capital goods. Muuˆls (2012) find that credit constraints matter for the extensive and
intensive trade margins of Belgian firms. Exports and imports are found to be differently
affected by financial factors, stressing the necessity of a comparison between the two trading
activities. Wagner (2014c), using data on German firms over the years 2008-2010, shows
that a better credit rating score positively influence the probability of import, the number
of goods imported as well the number of countries from which goods are imported, while the
share of imports on total sales is found not to be related to credit constraints.
It is worth remarking that the category of two-way traders is never taken into consid-
eration in the literature. However, financing constraints can be relevant also for two-way
traders, despite they have been shown to have the highest productivity levels (Andersson
et al., 2008). Two-way trading implies extra costs related to the joint entry into export-
ing and importing markets, which requires higher financial resources and sufficient liquidity.
Nevertheless, the presence of some extra costs that are common to exporting and importing
activities may reduce the additional financial resources necessary to carry out both activities
(Aristei et al., 2013).
The aim of this paper is to analyse whether credit constrains affect firm’s international
choices, not only with respect to the export behaviour, but also contributing to the analysis
of the impacts on both importing and two-way trading activities. In order to investigate
our main research questions, we use data from the “European Firms in a Global Economy”
(EFIGE) survey, which provides comparative data on European manufacturing firms.
As in Minetti and Zhu (2011), we test for the effect of financial constraints by using direct
1See Wagner (2014a) in this Special Issue for a comprehensive survey.
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binary indicators of credit rationing, based on survey responses. Our analysis offers three
main contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, together with a thorough analysis of the
extensive and intensive margins of export, we extend the analysis to importing firms as well
as to two-way traders. Our study is thus one of the few analyses on the effects of rationing
on import activities and, to the best of our knowledge, it represents the first attempt to
empirically assess the impact of financing constraints on two-way trading. Secondly, we test
for the presence of heterogeneities in the impacts of financial constraints on both exporting
and importing activities. We use information on the geographical distribution of trade
activities to assess whether the effects of rationing varies across destination and sourcing
areas due to differences in extra trade costs. With respect to the importing side, we further
disaggregate the effect of rationing on different types of intermediate goods and services.
Thirdly, as almost all studies consist in single-country analysis, our cross country dataset
allows to obtain international evidence on the effects of financial constraints on foreign trade.
Our main findings reveal that, when endogeneity of rationing is appropriately modelled,
both extensive and intensive margins of export and import are negatively affected by credit
constraints. Firms directly exporting from home country, those importing intermediate
goods and two-way traders display the highest marginal effects. When we disentangle among
different destinations and sources, we find that credit constraints are more relevant for firms
that export or import in EU countries only, while entering additional markets does not
significantly affect trade costs. The category of two-way traders behaves differently because
the impact of financial constraints increases when firms enter multiple markets and, even
though marginal effects are progressively lower when we introduce non-EU markets, credit
rationing remains strongly significant.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 illustrates the empirical methodology, while
Section 3 presents and describes the data. In Section 4 we discuss the main results obtained
for extensive and intensive foreign trade margins. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
2 Empirical Methods
2.1 Credit constraints and the extensive margin of firms’ foreign
trade activities
Financially fragile firms facing credit rationing may be characterised by a lower probability
of carrying out foreign trade activities as financial constraints hinder the ability of firms to
face the extra costs necessary to access foreign markets. Following Minetti and Zhu (2011),
the difference in operating profits when firm i carries out international trade activities or
not can be assumed to depend on firm’s characteristics and on credit constraints:
pi∗i = α1 + βRi +X
′
iγ1 + i (1)
where Ri is a binary indicator equal to 1 if firm i faces credit rationing, Xi is a k × 1
vector of firm control variables that may impact on firm’s differential operating profits and
i captures unobserved heterogeneity and unknown factors affecting pi
∗
i . Firm i will access
foreign markets only if it is able to face the related extra trade costs and pi∗i > 0. Assuming
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i to follow a standard normal distribution (i ∼N (0, 1)), the probability that firm i carries
out any export and/or import activity can be written as:
prob(Exporti/Importi = 1) = prob(di = 1) = prob(pi
∗
i > 0)
= prob(α1 + βRi +X
′
iγ1 + i > 0)
= Φ(α1 + βRi +X
′
iγ1) (2)
where di is an indicator of foreign trade activity and Φ(·) is the standard normal CDF.
In estimating equation (2), it should be taken into account that Ri may be endogenous
with respect to the decision of entering foreign markets. The likelihood of being financially
constrained reflects firm’s credit risk and depends on firm characteristics and credit market
conditions. Endogeneity of rationing may arise from an omitted variable issue: even after
controlling for firm characteristics, some unobserved factors may affect both trade parti-
cipation decision and the probability of credit rationing. As discussed in Minetti and Zhu
(2011), the presence of agency problems among firm’s stakeholders may increase both the
probability of entering foreign markets and its exposure to rationing, leading to underestim-
ate the negative effect of financial constraints. Correlation between foreign trade decisions
and financial constraints may also reflect the impact that firm’s activity abroad has on its
access to the credit market. To tackle this issue, we consider a recursive bivariate probit
model for the joint analysis of export/import and rationing probabilities:{
di = 1(α1 + βRi +X
′
iγ1 + i > 0)




iγ2 + µi > 0)
(3)
where Zi is a p× 1 vector of variables that are assumed to affect credit rationing, but do not
exert a direct effect on firm’s foreign trade activities. The error terms i and µi are assumed














with ρ = corr(i, µi). If ρ 6= 0, i and µi are correlated and univariate probit estimates of
β and γ1 in (2) are inconsistent. A formal test for the exogeneity of credit constraints will
then consist in testing the statistical significance of the correlation coefficient of the errors.
Despite identification of model (3) is achieved even when the same regressors appear in
both equations, the inclusion of identifying instruments in the second equation makes the
model robust to misspecification of error distribution and preserves the validity of exogeneity
test (see Monfardini and Radice (2008)). We therefore identify the effect of rationing under
the assumption that the set of instruments Z is excluded from the foreign trade equation.
2.2 Credit constraints and the intensive margin of firms’ export
and import activities
We further investigate the impact of credit rationing on intensive trade margins. In the
EFIGE dataset (see Section 3.1), trade intensity is measured as the share of exports/imports
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on total sales and it is characterised by a large number of observations at zero. Papke and
Wooldridge (1996) showed that in these cases a fractional regression approach is appropriate
to model the bounded nature of the dependent variable. Wagner (2001) has introduced
fractional models in the analysis of intensive trade margins and discussed the flaws related
to alternative approaches, like Tobit or two-step estimators.
In modelling fractional responses characterised by a non-negligible probability mass at
zero, a crucial assumption relates on how observed zeros are interpreted. When zero obser-
vations can be interpreted as the outcome of a single decision process (i.e. a utility or profit
maximising decision) a one-part fractional regression model is appropriate. Conversely, when
zeros and positive values can be assumed as the result of two distinct choice mechanisms,
participation and level decisions may be best modelled separately by means of two-part spe-
cifications, as in selection or zero-inflation models (see Ramalho et al. (2011) for an extended
discussion). Here, we follow Wagner (2001, 2014b,c) and consider a one-part model to ana-
lyse the determinants of the export/import-to-sales ratio, assuming that firms choose the
profit-maximising volume of exports/imports, which might be zero or a positive quantity,
and it is not necessary to separately model participation and level decisions. Formally:
E(yi|Xi, Ri) = Φ(α1 + βRi +X ′iγ1) (4)
where yi is the share of export/import on total sales. Model (4) can be estimated by means
of the robust quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) method of Papke and Wooldridge (1996).
To properly accounting for the potential endogeneity of rationing, in line with Wooldridge
(2013), we consider a bivariate specification that jointly models the fractional response vari-
able yi and the endogenous binary variable Ri:{
E(yi|Xi, Ri) = Φ(α1 + βRi +X ′iγ1 + δi)




iγ2 + µi > 0)
(5)
where δi is an omitted factor thought to be correlated with Ri and δi and µi are assumed
to be independent of Xi and Zi and follow a bivariate normal distribution with correlation
coefficient ρ and variances equal to σ2δi and 1, respectively.
2 This approach allows us to
extend the analysis of intensive trade margins of Wagner (2014b,c) and Egger and Kesina
(2013), by explicitly accounting for both the fractional nature of the dependent variable and
the potential endogeneity of credit constraints.
3 Data
3.1 Foreign Trade and Credit Rationing Indicators
Our empirical analysis is based on the public release of the “European Firms in a Global
Economy” (EFIGE) survey, coordinated by Bruegel and carried out in 2010, which provides
harmonised data on a representative sample of nearly 15000 manufacturing firms (with more
than 10 employees) in seven European countries: Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy,
2Estimation of model (5) is equivalent to a recursive bivariate probit in which yi is allowed to be fractional
and robust inference is used.
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Spain and the United Kingdom. The survey provides detailed cross-sectional information on
firms’ international activities, combined with data on ownership and management, workforce,
R&D and innovation activities, financing, market structure and pricing behaviour.
Questions related to foreign trade choices play a key role for the aims of our analysis.
With respect to exporting activities, based on question D1 of the EFIGE questionnaire (‘Has
the firm sold abroad some or all of its own product/services in 2008?’), we build a binary
indicator of firm direct export activity in 2008 equal to 1 if the firm either replied ‘Yes,
directly from home country’ or ‘Yes, directly from third countries where the firm produces’.
The questionnaire also provides information on the intensity of exports in terms of the export-
to-sales ratio (based on question D4: ‘Which percentage of your 2008 annual turnover did
the export activities represent?’) and a breakdown of export destinations areas for both
extensive and intensive margins.
Firm’s importing status is defined by a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm replied
‘Yes’, from abroad’ to question D23 (‘In 2008 has the firm purchased any services for its
domestic production?’) or to question D30 (‘In 2008 has the firm purchased raw material or
any intermediate goods for its domestic production?’), while the intensity of imports is again
measured as a percentage of annual turnover. Further questions allow to distinguish the
extensive margin of import by both source country and type of goods (raw materials; stand-
ardised intermediates; customised intermediates) and services (transport; communications
and IT; financial services; R&D and engineering; other services), while no disaggregated
information on the import-to-sales ratio is provided.
Based on information on exports and imports, we are able to identify two-way traders
and analyse the extensive margins of foreign trade for firms engaging in both trade activities.
In particular, a novel contribution of our analysis is that, differently from Muuˆls (2012) who
analyses export and import choices separately and does not distinguish between one- or
two-way traders, we explicitly investigate the role of credit constraints for firms that jointly
participate to both foreign trade activities.
From Table 1 we notice several heterogeneities in international trade choices. Italy and
France have the highest proportions of exporting and importing firms, respectively, while
Austria and the UK stand out with the highest percentage of two-way traders (38.13%
and 36.07%, respectively). At the same time, Austria, Hungary and Italy have the highest
conditional and unconditional export-to-sales ratios, while, focusing on importing firms,
France, Hungary and Italy show the highest import-to-sales ratios.
The second group of core variables refers to measures of credit rationing. Empirical
analyses have mainly relied on indirect measures of financial constraints inferred from firms’
financial statements. Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2013) have recently shown that commonly
used indicators based on balance-sheet data do not properly identify firms that are actually
constrained and may reflect differences in other firm characteristics and behaviours. Direct
measures of credit constraints, despite they may be affected by possible misperceptions, allow
to avoid interpretation problems of indirect indicators and have been increasingly used to
assess the effect of rationing on firms’ growth (Angelini and Generale, 2008), innovation and
R&D investment (Savignac, 2008) and international activities (Caggese and Cun˜at, 2013).3
3Alternatively, credit scores provided by external rating agencies have been recently adopted in empirical
analyses on the links between credit constraints and foreign trade activities (Secchi et al., 2011; Muuˆls, 2012;
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Table 1: Firms’ average extensive and intensive margins of international activities
Participation (in %): Intensity (ratio over firm’s total sales):
All firms Conditional on participation
Country N. of obs. Direct Export Import Two-way Trade Direct Export Import Direct Export Import
Austria 443 58.70 52.79 38.13 0.2382 0.0429 0.4133 0.0813
France 2,973 47.14 54.45 34.10 0.1330 0.0671 0.2880 0.1232
Germany 2,935 42.93 28.91 18.85 0.1254 0.0219 0.2983 0.0758
Hungary 488 51.61 47.35 32.34 0.2202 0.0654 0.4375 0.1381
Italy 3,021 64.36 34.91 28.95 0.2210 0.0376 0.3451 0.1077
Spain 2,832 48.55 39.80 28.07 0.1235 0.0311 0.2560 0.0781
UK 2,067 57.31 49.41 36.07 0.1671 0.0255 0.2938 0.0515
Total 14,759 52.01 41.56 29.19 0.1585 0.0385 0.3083 0.0927
Notes: participation frequencies and average intensities are computed using sample weights.
In our analysis, we consider direct indicators of financial constraints, based on firms’
responses to the following questions: (i) ‘During the last year, was the firm willing to increase
its borrowing at the same interest’ (F13) and (ii) ‘During the last year, did the firm apply
for more credit?’ (F14). Our first measure, which we refer to as Strong rationing, treats as
rationed those firms that have replied ‘Yes ’ to the first question and ‘Yes, applied for it but
was not successful ’ to the latter. As in Minetti and Zhu (2011), we also consider a second
broader measure of credit constraints (Weak rationing) and identify as weakly rationed those
firms willing to increase their borrowing at the same interest rate, but they either replied ‘No,
did not apply for it ’ to the second question or obtained more credit but at a higher cost (i.e.,
they replied ‘Yes ’ to question F18: ‘With reference to the last year has your firm experienced
an increase of the cost of debt charged?’). This variable allows us to exactly identify firms
that are either discouraged from applying for new credit or obtained credit at a higher rate,
thus reducing the size of the loans they can afford. These alternative measures capture
different intensities of financial constraints, with the strong rationing indicator expected to
have a larger impact on international trade behaviour.
Figure 1 presents the distribution of strongly and weakly rationed firms. In the whole
sample, 4% of the firms are strongly rationed, while 9.7% have obtained credit at higher
rates or have been discouraged from applying (panel a)). When we disaggregate the ana-
lysis by country, we note significant heterogeneities: Spain and Italy display the highest
unconditional frequencies of strongly (8.5% and 7.6%, respectively) and weakly (15.2% and
12.2%, respectively) financially constrained firms. The UK is characterised by a negligible
proportion of strongly rationed firms (0.5%), while the percentage of weakly rationed firms
(9.9%) is slightly higher than the average value in the whole sample.
Analysing conditional frequencies (panel b)), Italy emerges as the country with the
highest rate of firms being denied credit (38.7%), similarly to Hungary (37.2%) and Spain
(30.9%), confirming the significant tightening in credit availability during the crisis. Com-
paring this evidence to that obtained from panel a), it emerges that the limited access to
external financing in these countries is mainly the result of supply-side constraints rather
than of low credit demand. Conversely, UK stands out as the country with the lowest condi-
Wagner, 2014b,c). Scores directly reflect credit markets’ evaluation on firm’s creditworthiness and provide
a measure of the degree of financial constraints, rather than simply classifying firms as constrained or not.
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a) All Firms b) Conditional on apply/will to increase credit
Figure 1: Distribution of strongly and weakly rationed firms
tional frequency of strongly rationed firms (7.4%), but with the highest percentage of weakly
rationed firms (71.6%). Similar patterns emerge for Austria and Germany, suggesting that
in these countries intermediaries have only partially reduced access to credit by denying ap-
plications, but tightened lending conditions (i.e., higher interest rates and tougher collateral
requirements) may have increased the cost of credit and discouraged firms from applying.
Figure 2 presents the distribution of firms by credit rationing and foreign trade status.
Firms engaging in international trade activities display a slightly lower probability of being
strongly or weakly rationed (conditional on either applying for or willing to increase credit),
but differences in observed frequencies with respect to non-internationalised firms are not
statistically significant. This result may originate from the presence of several firm charac-
teristics that simultaneously increase (or decrease) rationing probability and the likelihood
of entering foreign markets. Failing in properly accounting for these common factors may
generate an endogeneity bias and distort the analysis of the effects of financing constraints.
a) Export b) Import c) Two-way Trade
Figure 2: Foreign trade activities and credit rationing
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3.2 Control Variables
We control for three types of firm characteristics. Firstly, we consider variables related to
the structure of the firm. We proxy firm’s size using the number of employees (Employees)
and its square to allow for non-linear effects, in order to assess whether larger firms have
higher probabilities to export/import and control for the fact that they sustain lower costs
when they need to raise funds (Wagner, 2014b). Firm’s age in years (Age), included also as
squared, allows to capture another important stylised fact related to the higher probability
of older firms to export/import. Due to the high proportion of missing values in the measure
of total factor productivity provided in the public release of the EFIGE dataset based on the
estimates of Altomonte et al. (2012), and to the lack of any other balance-sheet information,
we are unable to appropriately control for (partial or total) productivity at the firm level.4 We
thus include the categorical measure of turnover collected through the EFIGE questionnaire
that, considered together with the number of employees, allows to (partially) control for the
effect of productivity on trade activities (Wagner, 2012). We then include dummies indicating
the use of part-time employment or fixed-term contracts (Lab Flex ) and whether the size
of price margin over costs has increased (Increased Margins) as a proxy for profitability
(Fryges and Wagner, 2010). We also include a dummy indicating whether the firm has
a quality certification (Quality Certified), which proxies firm’s efficiency, and we use the
percentage of bank debt on total debt (Bank Fin) as a proxy of firm’s indebtedness.
The second type of control variables accounts for firm’s proprietary structure. We con-
sider variables accounting for first shareholder’s type (individual or groups of individuals)
(Individual first shareh) and its nationality (Foreign first shareh) and for group membership
(Group). We then control for the fact that the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is the indi-
vidual who owns the firm or a member of the controlling family (Fam CEO) and for the fact
that the CEO/owner takes most of the decisions in every area (Centralised decisions).
A third set of controls refers to firm’s technological structure of the firm and includes
variables accounting for the skill composition of the workforce (High skill empl), for the
share of R&D employees (R&D empl), for R&D investment (R&D inv share) and process
and product innovation activities (Innovation) over the last three years.
Finally, even though all models include a set of country and sector dummies, we account
for differences in the industrial context and in local development by including a variable
measuring average total factor productivity (Mean TFP) at the sectoral and regional level5,
based on the TFP measure provided in the EFIGE dataset. As discussed above, despite the
use of this productivity measure as firm-level control would severely reduce sample size, as
it is computable only for around 50% of the firms in the dataset, it still allows to compute
representative average productivity levels (see Altomonte and Aquilante (2012)).
Table A1 in the Appendix presents complete variable definitions and descriptive statistics.
4Information on the identity of individual firms, which would have allowed to link EFIGE data with firm-
level balance-sheet data from the Bureau van Dijk Amadeus database, is not made available by Bruegel.
5Additional information on the non-randomised classification by industry (NACE Rev.2 two-digit level)
and region (NUTS1 or NUTS2 levels, depending on the country) has been provided by Bruegel.
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3.3 Instrumental Variables
Identification of the effect of rationing on both extensive and intensive margins of foreign
trade is based on the assumption that the set of instrumental variables Z is included only in
the rationing equation. In particular, we use two indicators derived from the EFIGE survey
and related to firms’ debt concentration and collateral requirements, which are assumed to
directly affect firm’s ability to face both fixed entry costs and increased variable trade costs.
The first identification variable we consider is the percentage of total bank debt held at the
firm’s main bank, which provides a measure of bank borrowing concentration. An extensive
literature have discussed the role of relationship lending on credit cost and availability (Berger
and Udell, 2002; Elsas, 2005). Relationship lending reduces information asymmetries and
allows banks to better assess firms’ creditworthiness, facilitating ex-ante screening. Farinha
and Santos (2002) find that an increase in the proportion of total financing provided by
the main bank rises rationing probability. We thus expect that the share of total debt held
at firm’s main bank significantly affects rationing probability, whereas it does not play any
direct effect on extensive and intensive margins of foreign trade.
The second identification instrument is a binary variable indicating whether firms are
usually asked for collateral and personal guarantees when they apply for a loan.6 The
effects of collateral requirements on financing availability have been examined in several
theoretical and empirical studies (Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009). Guarantees may alleviate
distortions in credit allocation due to information asymmetries in bank relationships, but the
increased use of secured lending may also introduce new inefficiencies: banks may find it less
expensive to require a high level of guarantees than evaluating the profitability of investment
projects Manove et al. (2001). Based on these considerations, we believe that this indicator
of collateral requirements (despite being potentially biased by firm’s misperception) may
significantly affect credit rationing especially for new and small firms, while any possible
effect on foreign trade can be assumed to be mediated by financing availability.
In the empirical analysis we test for instruments validity by checking both their relevance
on rationing probability and their exogeneity with respect to foreign trade activities. As a
further control of the validity of our identification strategy, in Section 4.1.2 we carry out a
robustness check by adding to the set of instruments regional indicators encompassing overall
riskiness and dependence on external financing of each sector. Using data from the Bureau
van Dijk Amadeus database, we compute earnings volatility over 2006-2008 (measured as the
sector-region average standard deviation of EBITDA) for firms with more than 10 employees
and match this information with our data using EFIGE sectoral and regional identifiers. The
choice of this variable rests upon the assumption that differences in industry/regional-specific
riskiness may affect lenders’ risk taking behaviour and credit policies, thus influencing firms’
financial constraints. Furthermore, we control for differences in financial dependence at the
sectoral and regional level by means of two alternative indicators. The first is a “subjective
measure” constructed by averaging firm’s self-assessment of the external financing depend-
ence of its industry (measured on an ordinal scale ranging from 1 (‘not dependent at all ’)
6This variable is based on questions F16 (‘Which type of information does the bank normally use/ask to
assess your firms credit worthiness? ’) and F17 (‘What kind of collateral did you provide in order to obtain
credit? ’). It equals 1 for those firms that reply ‘Collateral ’ to question F16 and then ‘Personal guarantees
from the person who manages or owns the firm’ and ‘Guarantees on assets belonging to the firm’ to F17.
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to 5 (‘extremely dependent ’)) by region and sector. To assess whether this indicator appro-
priately captures sectoral financial dependence and does not simply reflect firm’s perception
on this industry-level feature, we also considered an “objective” measure based on average
firms’ debt ratio at the sector-region level (computed on Amadeus data). Several studies (see
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008)) have shown that industries with higher dependence on external
financing exhibit the highest reductions in growth rates, especially during financial distress
periods. Belonging to more financially vulnerable sectors thus directly affects firms’ output
performances and financing conditions, increasing rationing probability.
4 Results
4.1 The extensive margin of foreign trade activities
4.1.1 Baseline models
Complete estimation results of bivariate probit models of extensive trade margins and strong
rationing are presented in Table A2, while estimates of univariate probits and bivariate mod-
els of weak rationing are reported in Tables (i) and (ii) in the Online Appendix, respectively.7
Before analysing estimation results, in the last row of each Table we report results of the
Rao score test of models’ goodness-of-fit (Murphy, 2007; Chiburis et al., 2012). As it can
be noticed, the null hypothesis that univariate and bivariate models are correctly specified
cannot be rejected at the 1% significance level for all the specifications, supporting the
consistency of our estimates.
Signs and significance of the coefficients of the control variables in the foreign trade equa-
tions are all in line with expectations. Focusing on the strong rationing equations, younger
firms, those with lower turnover and more dependent on bank financing have a higher prob-
ability of denial. Country fixed effects are all positive and significant, confirming the lower
probability of credit rationing for firms in the UK (the reference country) with respect to all
the other countries. The two instrumental variables are always positive and highly signific-
ant, proving to be good predictors of rationing probability.8 The probability of credit denial
increases when firms concentrate their debt and when they are asked to pledge collateral and
personal guarantees. Estimated ρ coefficients are positive and significant, suggesting that
the unobserved determinants of both foreign trade and rationing are positively correlated
and the credit constraints indicator cannot be considered as exogenous.
The coefficients of strong rationing obtained from the bivariate probits are highly sig-
nificant and negative, differently from exogenous probit estimates where they are positive
but statistically insignificant. These sign changes confirm that endogeneity actually affects
7The Online Appendix is available at http://www.stat.unipg.it/daristei/ICCappendix.pdf.
8Instruments exogeneity with respect to foreign trade choices has been tested by means of the approach of
Evans and Schwab (1995), including the instruments, together with the credit rationing indicator, in all the
foreign trade equations and testing for their joint significance. Results for strong rationing indicate that their
exclusion cannot be rejected, with p-values equal to 0.2086, 0.1467 and 0.3055 for export, import and two-way
trading models, respectively. Instruments exogeneity has been also assessed by means of over-identification
tests based on linear instrumental variable estimates of extensive margins models. The p-values of the tests
are equal to 0.2546, 0.2171 and 0.2091 and do not reject the validity of the over-identifying restrictions. This
evidence further supports the hypothesis that the instruments do not directly affect firms’ trade activities.
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empirical results. The positive signs of the rationing indicators in the univariate probits are
therefore the result of not accounting for the endogeneity bias originated by the positive
correlation between unobservables. This result is in line with the findings of Minetti and
Zhu (2011) and can be explained by the fact that entering foreign markets, despite allowing
access to more financing sources, could also increase the probability of rationing since it
makes monitoring and enforceability of credit contracts more problematic and exacerbates
information asymmetries between domestic lenders and borrowers.9
In the case of weak rationing (Table (ii)), even though we obtain negative point estim-
ates, the effects on the probability of exporting and two-way trading are reduced, while the
estimated coefficient turns to be insignificant on import participation. As this variable cap-
tures a less severe form of rationing, it is plausible that it does not significantly affect firm’s
decision to enter foreign markets.
In order to exploit the international dimension of our database, we extend the baseline
bivariate probit specifications by including a full set of interactions between rationing indic-
ators and country dummies. The endogenous interaction terms have been instrumented by
adding to the set of identifying restrictions the interactions between country dummies and
the two instruments considered. Results from these extended specifications, presented in
Table (iii) in the Online Appendix, highlight that interactions terms are jointly insignificant
in all the models, suggesting that no significant cross-country difference characterises the
relationship between rationing and extensive trade margins.
As the effect of Ri is of primary interest,in what follows we focus only on the marginal
effects of rationing to have insights on the economic impact of financial constraints on trade
activities. Based on estimates of model (3) the average treatment effect (ATE) of rationing





[Φ(αˆ1 + βˆ +X
′
iγˆ1)− Φ(αˆ1 +X ′iγˆ1)] (6)
Estimated marginal effects of credit rationing for the baseline models are reported in
Table 2. Strong rationing significantly reduces the probability of exporting, importing and
carrying out two-way trading activities. As it can be noticed, we are able to disentangle the
effect of rationing on direct export activities from home country and from third countries
where the firm produces. We find that, in this latter case, the marginal effect is significantly
lower. It implies that fixed costs are lower and firms suffer less from rationing because,
for example, they can rely on infrastructure and facilities of the country from which it
exports. On the importing side, coherently with the findings of Muuˆls (2012) and Wagner
(2014b), strong credit rationing significantly reduces by 28% the extensive margin of import
activities. In particular, the highest marginal effect characterises imports of goods, with
strong rationing reducing the probability of importing intermediates by more than 33%,
while financial constraints do not affect imports of services from abroad. The marginal
9To check that the sign changes in strong rationing coefficients are not caused by the bivariate probit, we
consider linear probability models estimated by two-stage least squares. Results confirm that the coefficients
of strong rationing remain negative, even if they reduce and become significant only at the 5 and 10% levels
(as an example, the coefficient of strong rationing on export probability is -0.1945 with a standard error of
0.1130. Complete results are available upon request.
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Table 2: Extensive Margins: marginal effects of baseline estimates
Strong Rationing Weak Rationing
Direct Export -0.2910*** -0.0957*
(0.0692) (0.0533)
- from home country -0.2669*** -0.0908*
(0.0836) (0.0516)




- Import of goods -0.3324*** -0.1029*
(0.0673) (0.0569)
- Import of services -0.0404 0.0182
(0.0470) (0.0277)
Two-way Trade -0.2980*** -0.1022**
(0.0571) (0.0469)
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the regional level, are reported
in parentheses below the estimates.
***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
effect for two-way traders is in line with the one found for the case of direct export. This
suggests that extra costs sustained by these firms do not exceed to a greater extent those
sustained by one-way traders. Even though overall trade costs can be higher due to the need
of establishing linkages with different types of customers or suppliers, the likely presence of
cost complementarities contributes to reduce the additional financial resources necessary to
carry out both activities.
Marginal effects of weak rationing are much lower that those of strong rationing in all
cases. Estimated effects are significant at the 10% level for direct export and import of goods
and at the 5% for two-way trading and point out a reduction in the probability of carrying
out these foreign trade activities by about 10 percentage points for weakly rationed firms.
4.1.2 Robustness analysis
Table 3 presents results of robustness checks on the baseline estimates, Firstly, we assess the
robustness of our results to the choice of the set of identifying variables and re-estimate all
the specifications by including the additional instruments discussed in Section 3.3. As it can
be noticed from panels a1) and a2), results obtained with both the two sets of additional
instruments largely confirm the evidence obtained in the baseline specifications, supporting
the robustness of our identification strategy.10
As baseline models do not include controls for TFP and capital intensity due to their
high proportion of missing values, we assess whether results are robust to the inclusion of
these variables. Despite the estimation sample significantly reduces, strong rationing effects
remain unchanged, while the effects of weak rationing turn out to be insignificant in all the
specifications (panel b)).
10The additional instruments proved to be significant in the credit rationing equation of all the bivariate
probit models and non significant in explaining firms’ trade behaviour.
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Table 3: Robustness analysis
Strong Rationing Weak Rationing Strong Rationing Weak Rationing
a) Including additional instruments
a1) EBITDA volatility at the regional-sector level and a2) EBITDA volatility at the regional-sector level and
“self-assessed” sectoral financial dependence “objective” sectoral financial dependence
Direct Export -0.2876*** -0.0975* Direct Export -0.2846*** -0.0951*
(0.0686) (0.0538) (0.0681) (0.0534)
Import -0.2855*** -0.0793 Import -0.2890*** -0.0753
(0.0807) (0.0595) (0.0788) (0.0589)
Two-way Trade -0.2946*** -0.1036** Two-way Trade -0.2908*** -0.1002**
(0.0585) (0.0474) (0.0570) (0.0473)
b) Controlling for TFP and capital intensity c) Excluding bank financing control
Direct Export -0.2779*** -0.0650 Direct Export -0.2508*** -0.0140
(0.1052) (0.1207) (0.0873) (0.0448)
Import -0.3096*** 0.0203 Import -0.2290*** -0.0375
(0.1328) (0.0980) (0.0975) (0.0506)
Two-way Trade -0.3179*** -0.0174 Two-way Trade -0.2443*** -0.0460
(0.0832) (0.0958) (0.0730) (0.0429)
d) Controlling for significantly relying on export credit e) Controlling for turnover and workforce decrease
Direct Export -0.3153*** -0.0802* Direct Export -0.2620*** -0.0936*
(0.0710) (0.0450) (0.0835) (0.0535)
Import -0.2720*** -0.0655 Import -0.3121*** -0.0839
(0.0862) (0.0601) (0.0682) (0.0590)
Two-way Trade -0.2982*** -0.0929** Two-way Trade -0.3006*** -0.1097**
(0.0611) (0.0458) (0.0525) (0.0467)
f) Firms already exporting/importing before 2008 g) Excluding Austria and Hungary
Direct Export -0.2830*** -0.0879* Direct Export -0.2533*** -0.0728
(0.0699) (0.0502) (0.0740) (0.0540)
Import -0.2747*** -0.0476 Import -0.2642*** -0.0767
(0.0738) (0.0593) (0.0869) (0.0611)
Two-way Trade -0.2612*** -0.0784* Two-way Trade -0.2677*** -0.0921**
(0.0597) (0.0459) (0.0641) (0.0448)
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the regional level, are reported in parentheses below the estimates. Estimates are
obtained using sample weights. All regressions, except c), include the same controls used in the baseline models. In panel a), we
include as additional instruments the sector-region average standard deviation of EBITDA for firms with more than 10 employees
(computed on Amadeus data) and a “self-assessed” (a1)) and an “objective” measure (a2)) of sectoral financial dependence.
In panels d) and e), additional dummies are included to control for relying on export credit and for turnover and workforce decrease
in the last year. Sample size reduces to 7194 and 13684 observations for estimations reported in panels b) and g), respectively.
***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Baseline specifications include the share of bank debt over total debt (Bank fin) as a
proxy for firms’ financial conditions. However, since this may contribute to decrease the
marginal effect of rationing, we re-estimate extensive margins equations by excluding the
bank financing control. As it can be noticed (panel c)), strong rationing results are consistent
with previous estimates.
We rerun estimates including a variable measuring whether firm’s international activities
are mainly financed through export credit (panel d)), to control for the possibility that the
effects of rationing may be altered when foreign trade heavily relies on external support.
Results are in line with baseline estimates, except for the fact that the marginal effect of
strong rationing on export becomes higher in absolute terms than those on import and
two-way trading.
Baseline models are then extended with variables measuring whether firm’s turnover
and/or workforce have decreased during the last year. This allows to control for the possibil-
ity that the estimated negative effects of rationing may capture the impact of sale reductions
and downward adjustments in employment during the crisis. Results remain basically un-
changed, suggesting that the estimated marginal effects appropriately capture the impact of
credit rationing.
In panel f), we evaluate the impact of rationing on trade activities of firms that have
already exported or imported before 2008. The estimated marginal effects for one-way traders
remain basically unchanged, suggesting that financial constraints are relevant also for firms
that are active on foreign markets for a longer time, in line with the findings of Wagner
(2014b,c). Results also point out that strong rationing has a lower impact (-26.1%) on firms
that started to carry out two-way trading activities before 2008.
Finally, we check whether results are affected by the country composition of the EFIGE
dataset. Since Austria and Hungary are significantly underrepresented (with 443 and 488
observations, respectively), we rerun regressions excluding firms from these two countries.
Estimated marginal effects of strong rationing are slightly reduced, but the main findings
turn out to be not significantly affected by the country composition of the sample.
4.1.3 Entry into multiple foreign markets and different types of imported goods
and services
We extend the analysis by going deeper into the geographical distribution and composition
of foreign trade activities. Firstly, we exploit information on export destinations. In our
sample, only 26.8% of the exporters enter a single foreign market, while more than 51% sell
their products into more than three areas. Entering in multiple markets can help firms to
diversify risks and accumulate knowledge of different types of markets, but it can involve
further costs. At the same time, the knowledge gained in the first foreign market can be
spread over other markets, reducing the fixed costs of entering additional export destinations.
Results presented in Table 4 confirm that, even though strong credit rationing negatively
affects both single and multi-destinations exporting activities, the marginal effect on the
probability of entering multiple markets is equal to -25.79% and it is lower than that for
single destination exports (-37%).
We then disaggregate export activities by destinations areas, conditional on already ex-
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- Other European (Non EU) Countries -0.1580
(0.1237)
- China & India -0.0368
(0.0627)
- Other Asian Countries -0.1208*
(0.0710)
- USA & Canada -0.1292*
(0.0769)
- Latin America -0.0324
(0.2079)
Notes: Table reports marginal effects of Strong Rationing only.
Robust standard errors, clustered at the regional level, are reported in
parentheses below the estimates.
***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
porting in EU countries. In the EFIGE sample, firms seem to enter the EU market as a
way to facilitate access to other foreign markets: more than the 92% of the exporting firms
enter the EU market and almost 70% of them also sell their products outside the EU. For
this reason, we test whether credit rationing affects firms’ ability to face the extra costs of
entering other non-EU markets. The estimates show that for firms that are already present
in the EU exporting market rationing does not affect their exporting behaviour towards
other areas except for the case of exports to the US, which are characterised by a weakly
significant effect.
The EFIGE survey also allows to disentangle imports on the basis of the type of inter-
mediate goods and services imported and with respect to sourcing countries. From Table 5
we notice that credit constraints have a lower impact on firms importing intermediate goods
and services from multiple countries. Moreover, we find that firms already importing from
the EU are not significantly affected by credit rationing when sourcing also from non-EU
countries, except for the case of importing from China and India. These results can be due to
the fact that those type of markets are characterised by different technological structure that
imply more difficult relationships with suppliers. Firms may need to spend more time and
knowledge to adapt those imported inputs to their production process, therefore causing, at
the beginning, a likely decrease in productivity.
Results from the detailed disaggregation of imported goods and services confirm that
financial constraints significantly reduce the probability of importing intermediate goods
only. The main reason of this evidence is that importing components and tasks imply
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Table 5: Import sources and types of imported goods and services: marginal effects of
rationing
Imports of goods Imports of services
Import Sources: Import Sources:
Single Source -0.2658*** Single Source -0.1395***
(0.0750) (0.0609)
Multiple Sources -0.2000*** Multiple Sources -0.0031
(0.0894) (0.0253)
EU -0.3216*** EU -0.0697*
(0.0642) (0.0412)
Outside EU -0.1888*** Outside EU -0.0169
(0.0523) (0.0197)
- Other European (Non EU) Countries 0.0090 - Other European (Non EU) Countries -0.0049
(0.1919) (0.0112)
- China & India -0.1118*** - China & India -0.0202
(0.0421) (0.0164)
- Other Asian Countries -0.0047 - Other Asian Countries -0.0043
(0.0398) (0.0140)
- USA & Canada -0.0280 - USA & Canada -0.0040
(0.1243) (0.0115)
- Latin America 0.0056 - Latin America -0.0002
(0.0477) (0.0079)
Types of goods: Types of services:
Raw materials -0.3475*** Transport -0.0493*
(0.0666) (0.0291)
Standardised intermediates 0.0098 Communications and IT -0.0027
(0.0624) (0.0136)
Customised intermediates -0.1325** Financial services 0.0058
(0.0575) (0.0143)
R&D and Engineering services 0.0174
(0.0260)
Other services (e.g. consultants) 0.0084
(0.0212)
Notes: Table reports marginal effects of Strong Rationing only. Robust standard errors, clustered at the regional level, are
reported in parentheses below the estimates.
***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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different trade costs. As pointed out by Bas and Berthou (2012), intermediate goods are
usually imported on a regular basis and therefore affect firms that are less liquid, despite the
fixed costs implied by this trade activity can be significantly lower than those of importing
services. When we differentiate among different types of imported goods, we find significant
heterogeneities in the impacts of financial constraints. Specifically, importing raw materials
is particularly difficult for credit rationed firms. This is an expected result and it is related to
the extremely high dependency of European firms on imports of raw materials. As pointed
out by Bridgman (2012), raw materials are traded even when trade costs are high, thus
increasing the role of financing constraints on their acquisition from abroad. Our results also
point out that financial constraints have no impact on imports of standardised intermediates,
while they hamper purchases of customised intermediates that are exclusively manufactured
for the firm. Conversely, distinguishing among different types of services yields mainly non
significant results and only importing of transport services is affected by credit rationing.
By combining the answers relative to country of destination and sourcing countries, we
built different categories of two-way traders. In our sample, only 12.4% of the two-way
traders enter a single foreign market, while almost 41% are active in multiple markets. At
the same time, 75% of firms carrying out both trading activities exclusively operate within
the EU market and 40% of them contemporaneously import and export outside the EU.
Analysing the estimated marginal effects (Table 6), we first note that, contrary to what
happens for export and import separately, extra costs of two-way trading are higher when
entering multiple markets rather than a single market, causing credit constraints to negat-
ively affect this type of international activity. The main reason for this can be related to
the fact that firms may be unable to efficiently accumulate knowledge to be exploited on
both destination and sourcing markets. If destinations and sourcing market are not perfectly
matching in terms of knowledge, extra trade are not totally overlapping, thus increasing the
financial resources necessary to carry out both activities in multiple markets. When consid-
ering different market combinations, we find that when two-way traders exclusively operate
in EU markets they suffer more from credit constraints. This is true also when different com-
binations are considered, but the values of marginal effects are lower. In particular, firms
that contemporaneously import and export outside the EU, conditional on already trading
in the EU, are negatively affected by credit constraints, but to a much lower extent than
those two-way trading in the EU only. The reason is that higher knowledge of importing and
exporting in EU markets can contribute to scale down overall extra costs for firms carrying
out two-way trading activities, which remain nevertheless higher than those sustained by
one-way traders.
4.2 The intensive margin of export and import activities
Complete estimates from the exogenous and endogenous fractional models of export and
import intensive margins are reported in Tables (iv) and (v) in the Online Appendix. From
the Tables, it is firstly possible to note that most of the control variables display the same
signs and significance levels as in the extensive margin analysis.
When we explicitly account for the endogeneity of financial constraints, the coefficients
of strong and weak rationing on the unconditional level of export/import are both negative
and highly significant, differently from the exogenous fractional models. In all the bivariate
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Export EU - Import EU -0.3039***
(0.0427)
Export Outside EU - Import EU -0.2172***
(0.0663)
Import Outside EU - Export EU -0.1461***
(0.0434)
Export Outside EU - Import Outside EU -0.1422***
(0.0434)
Notes: Table reports marginal effects of Strong Rationing only.
Robust standard errors, clustered at the regional level, are reported in
parentheses below the estimates.
***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
models, the two identification variables considered are confirmed to positively affect the
probability of rationing, while they prove to be exogenous with respect to the export/import-
to-sale ratio.11
As for the extensive margin, the analysis of rationing is based on the marginal effects
of Ri, reported in Table 7. As shown by Wooldridge (2013), average treatment effects in
fractional probit models with a dummy endogenous regressor can be computed using (6)
based on estimates of model (5).
In line with Muuˆls (2012), we find that the intensive margins of both exporting and
importing activities are negatively affected by credit rationing and they just differ with
respect to the size of the marginal effects.
The unconditional intensity of direct exports significantly reduces when firm faces finan-
cial constraints, as in Minetti and Zhu (2011) and Wagner (2014b). The estimated average
treatment effect of credit denial on the unconditional level of export is equal to -9.47%, while
firms that are discouraged from applying for credit or are charged higher interest rates have
an export-to-sales ratio 5.9% lower than non-weakly rationed firms.
Differently from Wagner (2014c), who finds that the intensity of imports of German firms
is not affected by financial constraints, we find that the unconditional level of imported goods
and services reduces by about 4.34% and 2% when firms are strongly and weakly rationed,
respectively. Deepening the analysis by type of imports, it is possible to note that the overall
11The p-values of the over-identification tests in models with strong and weak rationing are equal to 0.1812
and 0.4772 and to 0.2436 and 0.4754, respectively for the export and the import-to-sales ratio.
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Table 7: Intensive Margins: marginal effects of credit rationing
Strong Rationing Weak Rationing
Direct Export -0.0947*** -0.0590***
(0.0365) (0.0219)
- Direct Export in EU -0.0806*** -0.0345**
(0.0100) (0.0157)




- Import of goods -0.0430*** -0.0201***
(0.0045) (0.0071)
- Import of services -0.0007 0.0010
(0.0029) (0.0062)
Notes: Bootstrapped (500 reps.) standard errors are reported in parentheses.
***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
marginal effect is mainly driven by the negative and significant impact on imports of goods,
whereas marginal effects of both strong and weak rationing on imports of services are very
small and not significantly different from zero.12
As discussed in Section 3.1, we are able to disentangle the analysis of the intensive
margins of international trade activities by export destinations, but not by import source
countries. Marginal effects of financial constraints on the level of EU exports are negative
and significant: strong and weak rationing reduce the share of exports on total sales by 8.06%
and 3.46%, respectively. When we analyse how rationing affects export intensity in non-EU
markets conditional on exporting to the EU, we find that neither strong nor weak rationing
plays a significant role in curbing firms’ foreign sales. Adding other foreign destinations does
not exacerbate credit rationing effects on export intensity. This result, together with the
evidence obtained for the extensive margin, thus shows that, for firms already exporting to
EU markets, financial constraints neither represent a barrier for their entry into a second
foreign market nor they affect firms’ export intensive margin in non-EU countries.
12The reliability of the estimated marginal effects has been assessed by means of alternative estimation
approaches. Linear IV and two-limit Tobit estimates (reported in Table (vi) in the Online Appendix) confirm
the negative and significant effects of rationing on intensive trade margins. Moreover, the same robustness
checks discussed in Section 4.1.2 have been carried out and support the stability of estimated effects (results
are available upon request).
20
5 Conclusions
Participation to foreign markets requires additional financial resources and sufficient liquidity
to cover extra costs involved by export and import activities. This is the reason why credit
constrained firms may be excluded from international activities or experience a reduction in
their intensive trade margins.
Based on data from the EFIGE survey for a sample of European manufacturing firms,
we provide empirical evidence on the role of credit constraints in hampering the extensive
and intensive margins of firms’ international activities. We also explore heterogeneities in
the effects of rationing by accounting for different destination and source countries and for
different types of imported goods and services. A further novelty of our approach is that we
explicitly analyse the two-way traders category, which has never been examined before.
Empirical results point out that firms directly exporting their production abroad, those
importing intermediate goods and two-way traders suffer to a great extent from the impact
credit constraints. When considering firms’ access to different types of foreign markets,
we find that, conditional on already exporting or importing to/from the UE, adding other
foreign markets does not exacerbate rationing problems. On the importing side, we find that
credit constraints are significant only in reducing the probability of importing intermediate
goods. This reveals that importing services can be less demanding in terms of financing,
irrespective of the type of service imported. An interesting result emerging from the analysis
of two-way traders is that firms contemporaneously exporting and importing from multiple
countries are those most negatively affected by credit constraints. This may indicate that,
despite the costs of accessing foreign markets can be spread over different destinations, the
extra trade costs generated by both activities are not totally overlapping and increase the
impact of financing constraints.
As far as the intensive margins are concerned, we find that exporting and importing
levels are negatively affected by both strong and weak rationing. This evidence suggests
that credit constraints are not only relevant for the extensive margins, but also significantly
reduce the volumes of exports and imports by hampering firms’ ability to finance both fixed
and variable costs of foreign trade.
Some relevant policy implications can be singled out from our findings. Firstly, public
policy measures should be aimed at reducing fixed costs of international trade activities
and supporting not only firms that want to enter foreign markets, but also those willing
to expand their presence abroad. Furthermore, specific attention should be also devoted to
two-way traders, which emerge as particularly vulnerable to financial constraints. As the
recent financial crisis has shown, the tightening in firms’ access to external financing can
represents a stumbling block especially for firms involved in both trading activities and for
those that do not differentiate risks and spread entry costs across different foreign markets.
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Appendix
Table A1: Control variables: definitions and descriptive statistics
Variable Definition Mean Std.Dev
Age Years since firm’s establishment 34.126 30.573
Employees Total number of employees 51.229 80.757
R&D empl Equals 1 if the share of RD workers is higher than the corresponding 0.109 0.311
national average; 0 otherwise
High skill empl Equals 1 if the share of graduate employees is higher than the corresponding 0.278 0.448
national average; 0 otherwise
Lab Flex Equals 1 if firm uses part-time employment or fixed-term contracts; 0.593 0.491
0 otherwise
Individual first shareh Equals 1 if the first shareholder is an individual or group of individuals; 0.768 0.422
0 otherwise
Foreign first shareh Equals 1 if the first shareholder is foreign; 0 otherwise 0.079 0.270
Group Equals 1 if the firm belongs to any kind of group (national or foreign); 0.193 0.395
0 otherwise
Centralised decisions Equals 1 if the CEO/owner takes most of the decisions in every area; 0.698 0.459
0 otherwise
Fam CEO Equals 1 if the CEO is the individual (or a member of the family) who 0.640 0.480
owns/controls the firm; 0 otherwise
Innovation Equals 1 if the firm has carried out product or process innovation; 0 otherwise 0.642 0.479
R&D inv share R&D investment as a % of total turnover 3.452 7.663
Turnover Turnover classes, from 1 (‘less than 1 million euro’) to 7 (‘more than 2.816 1.252
250 million euro’)
Increased Margins Equals 1 if the size of price margin over costs has increased 0.063 0.244
during the last year; 0 otherwise
Quality Certified Equals 1 if firm has any form of quality certification; 0 otherwise 0.571 0.495
Bank Fin % of short and medium-long bank debt over total debt 15.123 29.442
Mean TFP Average TFP at the sectoral and regional level -0.025 0.204
Notes: descriptive statistics are computed using sample weights.
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Table A2: Extensive margins of foreign trade and strong rationing: bivariate probit results
(1) (2) (3)
Strong Rationing Direct Export Strong Rationing Import Strong Rationing Two-way Trade
Strong rationing -0.8675*** -0.8332*** -1.0146***
(0.2074) (0.2464) (0.1912)
Age -0.0037** 0.0042*** -0.0036* 0.0016 -0.0036* 0.0035***
(0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0010) (0.0018) (0.0013)
Age2 0.0166* -0.0085 0.0176* -0.0064 0.0182* -0.0126
(0.0092) (0.0089) (0.0102) (0.0064) (0.0097) (0.0084)
Employees 0.0033*** 0.0015** 0.0033*** 0.0022*** 0.0035*** 0.0021***
(0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0006)
Employees2 -0.0057** -0.0041*** -0.0057** -0.0037*** -0.0063*** -0.0041***
(0.0024) (0.0015) (0.0023) (0.0012) (0.0023) (0.0012)
R&D empl 0.0770 0.1076*** 0.0524 0.0181 0.0775 0.0799**
(0.0674) (0.0380) (0.0671) (0.0403) (0.0675) (0.0375)
High skill empl -0.0184 0.2651*** -0.0214 0.1879*** -0.0164 0.2112***
(0.0502) (0.0306) (0.0492) (0.0281) (0.0466) (0.0273)
Lab Flex 0.0612 0.1234*** 0.0420 0.1129*** 0.0440 0.1207***
(0.0424) (0.0273) (0.0428) (0.0271) (0.0425) (0.0276)
Individual first shareh -0.0892 -0.0918** -0.0951 -0.0496 -0.1024 -0.1001**
(0.0648) (0.0397) (0.0624) (0.0362) (0.0630) (0.0428)
Foreign first shareh -0.1196 0.4377*** -0.0685 0.3488*** -0.0797 0.3806***
(0.1083) (0.0573) (0.1178) (0.0587) (0.1170) (0.0578)
Group -0.0398 -0.0330 -0.0450 -0.0163 -0.0344 -0.0054
(0.0802) (0.0517) (0.0799) (0.0394) (0.0796) (0.0478)
Centralised decisions 0.0244 -0.1095*** 0.0214 -0.0372 0.0170 -0.0335
(0.0455) (0.0295) (0.0468) (0.0307) (0.0445) (0.0288)
Fam Ceo -0.0509 0.0517* -0.0394 0.0882*** -0.0397 0.0677**
(0.0448) (0.0270) (0.0455) (0.0315) (0.0428) (0.0302)
Innovation 0.0824* 0.3153*** 0.0733 0.3361*** 0.0882* 0.3367***
(0.0488) (0.0276) (0.0472) (0.0281) (0.0474) (0.0306)
R&D inv share 0.0046 0.0160*** 0.0043 0.0059*** 0.0041 0.0094***
(0.0037) (0.0023) (0.0034) (0.0016) (0.0037) (0.0015)
Turnover -0.0831*** 0.2345*** -0.0812*** 0.2096*** -0.0895*** 0.2189***
(0.0311) (0.0220) (0.0315) (0.0177) (0.0306) (0.0207)
Increased Margins 0.0572 0.1606*** 0.0638 0.1558*** 0.0715 0.2131***
(0.1030) (0.0483) (0.1004) (0.0423) (0.0998) (0.0466)
Quality Certified 0.0689 0.0285 0.0629 0.0630** 0.0606 0.0991***
(0.0474) (0.0306) (0.0469) (0.0248) (0.0455) (0.0241)
Bank Fin 0.0063*** 0.0026*** 0.0064*** 0.0015*** 0.0064*** 0.0023***
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005)
Mean TFP -0.4007** 0.3125** -0.4269** 0.1624 -0.4464** 0.1637
(0.1855) (0.1521) (0.1872) (0.1130) (0.1855) (0.1393)
Main bank share 0.0066*** 0.0067*** 0.0066***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007)
Collateral 0.4317** 0.4675** 0.4175**
(0.1856) (0.1895) (0.1832)
Austria 0.6662*** -0.1422 0.6747*** -0.0769* 0.6406*** -0.0710
(0.2443) (0.1028) (0.2277) (0.0399) (0.2332) (0.0938)
France 0.9425*** -0.2358*** 0.8279*** 0.1865*** 0.9319*** -0.0034
(0.1318) (0.0747) (0.1166) (0.0560) (0.1266) (0.0627)
Germany 0.8079*** -0.5345*** 0.8209*** -0.6683*** 0.8040*** -0.6461***
(0.1216) (0.0568) (0.1151) (0.0335) (0.1178) (0.0431)
Hungary 0.6578*** 0.0857 0.7493*** 0.1216** 0.6946*** 0.1248
(0.1745) (0.0694) (0.1694) (0.0568) (0.1724) (0.0817)
Italy 1.5026*** 0.2392*** 1.3138*** -0.3795*** 1.4759*** -0.1514***
(0.1331) (0.0774) (0.1143) (0.0519) (0.1321) (0.0573)
Spain 1.2883*** -0.0921 1.2858*** -0.1474** 1.2558*** -0.0733
(0.1228) (0.0771) (0.1136) (0.0583) (0.1230) (0.0653)
Intercept -3.9001*** -0.6734*** -3.1765*** -1.1379*** -3.8243*** -1.5389***
(0.2364) (0.0857) (0.1718) (0.0789) (0.2422) (0.0931)
ρ 0.5181*** 0.4642*** 0.6706***
(0.1241) (0.1498) (0.1419)
N 14590 14590 14590
ll -10685.13 -10715.59 -9602.60
Goodness-of-fit 12.32 11.27 12.16
score test [0.1947] [0.2578] [0.2045]
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the regional level, are reported in parentheses below the estimates. p-values of the goodness-of-fit tests
are reported in square brackets. All estimates are obtained using sample weights and include (unreported) sectoral controls.
***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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